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"As soon as someone says about affairs of state ‘what do I care?’ the state has to be 
considered lost" Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
The existence of political interest in society is critical for the health and 
future of all democracies and countries aspiring to become democracies. Likewise, a 
populace having the ability and willingness to participate in politics is crucial for a 
healthy society. An interest in politics and a desire to participate are not the same 
thing as actually being able to participate. Currently, there is a lack of literature 
which examines these phenomena on a country level. This study will examine the 
role that country level variables play in determining the propensity for a society to 
engage in political action and its interest level in politics. These relationships will be 
tested using graphical and statistical methods. I find several interesting 
relationships between my dependent and independent variables, which help explain 
why some countries are more interested/participatory than others, as well as 
provide avenues for additional research.  
 
Principally, I conclude that the primary country level variable affecting the 
level of interest in politics within a country to be average wealth. I also find that 
multiple country level variables correlate significantly with the propensity to 
engage in political action, including: Education, income, democracy, press freedom, 
corruption and infrastructure. I consider corruption to be the most pervasive 
problem for a country as a whole, and I will delve more deeply into this relationship. 
Finally, I conclude that country level variables affect political interest and the 
willingness to engage in political action differently. 
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Introduction 
Political interest and participation are the cornerstones of any civic society. 
They are essential components for good governance; however, the number of 
individuals completely uninterested in politics is surprising. Throughout the world 
more than 50% of the average population responding to the World Value Survey 
(WVS) is disinterested in politics. Interestingly, this percentage has persisted 
despite the unprecedented prevalence of news media and the advent of twenty-four 
hour news channels. It is difficult for us not to hear about politics on the Internet, 
TV, or when reading the newspaper. Despite this increased access to information, 
politics has become a taboo discussion, which we only discuss with those close to us. 
The current status of political participation is no different, and it is just as important 
as an interest in politics. It is especially concerning given the increasing 
interconnectivity of our society. 
Politics is the lifeblood of a democracy. It is the process through which 
citizens choose the individuals who they think will best represent their interests 
while shaping a nation’s policies. It is also the process in which those politicians 
engage in order to pass legislation. It is under the umbrella of politics that the 
majority of national institutions take shape. These institutions can quite literally 
determine daily life for individuals, from education quality to healthcare access in a 
society.  
 5 
An interest in politics 1in a country is essential for having a healthy 
democracy and is critical for countries aspiring to become democracies. An 
informed, interested, and participating electorate is essential for electing good 
politicians. It has a multitude of ramifications in the political and social spheres of a 
country, because politics is rarely limited to its individual sphere. Without an 
interested electorate, politicians are less beholden to make decisions that are most 
beneficial to everyone. In addition, an uninterested electorate may not even be 
aware of what political action they would like from their representative. Like it or 
not, politics is a crucial element to any country. 
Given that politics comprises an essential element of modern democracies, 
one may expect a higher interest level in politics. Unfortunately this is not the case, 
and the percentage of those even “somewhat” interested in politics is below half the 
populace of the world. Yet, electorates in some countries tend to be more interested 
in politics than electorates in others; furthermore, the interest level tends to remain 
stable over time (Prior 2010). This fact leads to the conclusion that there may be 
country level differences that account for the differing levels of political interest and 
participation between countries because, if there were global shifts in political 
interest and participation, it would increase/decrease in most countries. This has 
not been the case. 
Currently, there is a lack of literature about what explains political interest 
and participation and why they may be different from country to country. The goal 
                                                        
1 For the purpose of this paper an interest in politics will be defined by the response 
to the WVS question “How interested would you say you are in politics”. The results 
for “very interested” and the sum of “somewhat” and “Very” interested will be 
considered in this paper. 
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of this paper will be to explore the country level variables behind political interest 
and participation through the use of a cross-national comparative study. This should 
create a better understanding of the nature of political interest and participation 
and which variables are the most important for their creation. In addition, this helps 
explain to the reader why some countries are more interested in politics than others 
and why some participate more. 
The thesis will be divided into six parts. The first section will explain the 
importance of political interest. The following section will address the significance 
of political participation. I will then introduce my independent variables and the 
theory behind why I choose them.  Next, I will present my dependent interest and 
participation variables along with the methods of my study. Finally, I will present 
the results of both the bivariate graphical analysis and the linear regressions. The 
paper will then be concluded with a discussion of the results 
Importance of political interest 
While the WVS will define political interest quantitatively for the purposes of 
this study, it will also be helpful to examine the qualitative explanations as well.  
 
Deth argues that there are two types of political interest. First, he argues that 
political interest can be thought of as the “degree to which politics arouses a 
citizen’s curiosity” or “a citizen’s attentiveness to politics.” The second way to 
conceptualize political interest is in terms of political salience or “the relative 
importance of political matters compared with other activities (Holleque 
2011) 
 
Meanwhile, Shani thinks of political interest as  “the motivation to engage in 
politics,” which consists of both the desire to learn about politics and the desire to 
participate in politics (Shani 2007). For my study I will align myself with the 
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definition presented by Dr. Shani. This is because I believe that there are more 
concrete implications to political interest than merely paying attention allows for. 
In order to justify research behind the important indicators of political 
interest, we must first answer the question: Why is political interest important? The 
implications of the attitude of being interested in politics have been stressed by the 
literature on democratic theory, the literature on political participation, as well as 
by the literature on political psychology (Martin 2003). I will explain each of these in 
the following section. 
A high level of political sophistication is desirable in a democratic society as 
evidenced by Dr. Lipjhart in his seminal 1996 presidential address to the American 
Political Sciences Association (Lipjhart 1996). Yet, a high level of political 
sophistication is naturally unattainable without a general  interest in politics. Dr. 
Luskin concluded, “Sophistication depends, above all, on motivation…. 
Sophistication, in these results, is much less a function of the information to which 
people are exposed than of what they can and are motivated to make of it. The 
readiness is pretty nearly all” (Luskin 1990). An interest in politics is this motivation 
and readiness. Besides being more likely to participate in politics, those interested 
in politics will also be more able to make sophisticated political decisions. The 
benefits of a more politically sophisticated society are numerous, but on the ground 
level it should lead to more efficient government policies and increased citizen 
welfare. 
An interest in politics is essential for making sense of political information 
and making rational political decisions. An incredibly intelligent engineer with no 
 8 
interest in politics will have a difficult time following a presidential debate, 
especially if he has not been exposed to any news media. Of course, he may be able 
to do so, but he is more likely to be politically sophisticated and readily interpret the 
information if he is interested in politics. An “interest in Politics is said to help 
citizens process complex information”(Martin 2003). “In other words, an interest in 
politics is an indicator of citizens’ capacity to make sense of politics” (Lodge and 
Taber, 2000; McGraw, 2000; Kuklinski et al, 2001). An electorate’s ability to make 
sense of politics has consequences when considering how well their interest will be 
represented. 
An interested cohort is more able to process and interpret information 
regarding politics. Hence, they will be able to make better judgments about whether 
their politician is representing the wishes of the cohort,  if they are preforming 
poorly ,or behaving in their own self-interest. Thus, an interested cohort is better 
able to hold their elected representatives accountable for their actions and votes. Dr. 
Shani explains this process:  
Interest in politics can have consequences for the relationship between 
citizens and their political representatives. When people, as a consequence of 
being interested, have attitudes towards politics, take decisions related to 
political matters, and express these attitudes and judgments, they are better 
able to resist manipulation and to exert control over their political 
representatives(Shani 2010). 
 
 This ability to exert control was demonstrated, at least in a region of 
democracies, by Dennis Mueller when he found that “higher voter participation 
rates in well established Latin American countries significantly increase both total 
government expenditures and expenditures on education”(Mueller 2003). 
Before going further, I will first define political participation, a result of an 
 9 
interest in politics, as the term can be used to describe the minimal engagement in 
politics, the act of voting, as well as the most extreme forms of engagement such as 
joining a strike, or volunteering in an interest campaign. Broadly, the term aptly 
describes each of these extremes of participation; however, for the purpose of this 
paper it is important to recognize the dichotomy within political participation. Sofia 
Olsson defined this as institutionalized and non-institutionalized participation.  
The first includes participation, such as turnout, campaign work, and party 
membership is closely related to the institutional structures, and is initiated by the 
political elite. However, non-institutionalized participation, such as protesting and 
boycotting, are initiated by non-elite actors and is situated outside the formal 
political institutions (Olsson 2013).  
 
This paper will not address institutionalized forms of participation, as it 
primarily concerns voter turnout, which I consider a thoroughly investigated topic; 
however, it is an important distinction to make for the rest of the paper, in order to 
full understand political participation.   Consequently, this paper will focus primarily 
on non-institutionalized participation. If I am referring specifically to one type of 
participation or the other I will state so explicitly. 
Political interest is also a contributing factor to a person’s political efficacy. 
Campbell originally defined political efficacy as “the feeling that individual political 
action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process, that it is 
worthwhile to perform ones civic duties” (Campbell 1954). There are two different 
types of efficacy explained in the literature.  This first is internal efficacy, which is 
one’s personal view of how effectively, in addition to the amount of influence, they 
see themselves as having on the political system when they engage in politics. On 
the other hand, external efficacy is less directly influenced by an interest in politics 
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as it “refers to citizen’s perceptions of the possibility to impact the political process, 
as a result of those in power adhering to citizen opinion” (Olsson 2013). External 
efficacy is most likely determined by broad country level variables such as the 
freedom of the press, corruption level, GDP, political system, etc. Meanwhile, 
internal efficacy is most often built on the individual level and is often related to an 
individual’s level of education, political interest, income, and class status. 
Empirically, political efficacy can be considered a relatively strong predictor of 
political participation (Verba, Schlotzman, and Brady 1995: Sullivan and Riedel 
2001).  
Further support for the idea that political interest is a good indicator of 
whether or not an individual will participate in politics was illustrated by the fact 
that in the United States the “average reported turnout in the 1964–2004 period 
was 82% for those who follow what’s going on in government and politics most of 
the time, 71% for those who do so some of the time, 54% for those who do so only 
now and then, and 35% for those who are hardly interested in politics” (Shani 
2010). Higher levels of participation have numerous benefits in multiple spheres 
e.g., economic, political, social, that culminates in a healthier and more equitable 
society (Horn, Lijphart, Hicks and Swank 1992). 
Support for this idea is provided by Sydney Verba’s civic voluntarism model. 
When asked Why don’t you participate the responses are generally along the lines of 
“Because they can’t; because they don’t want to; or because nobody asked. In other 
words people may be inactive because they lack resources, because they lack 
psychological engagement with politics, or because they are outside of the 
 11
recruitment networks that bring people into politics” (Verba 1995:26). Political 
interest is a critical part of having a psychological engagement with politics, and 
hence is an indicator of participation. 
Furthermore, Sofia Arkhede Olsson demonstrated empirically that political 
interest is the strongest predictor of non-institutionalized participation and the 
strongest predictor of institutionalized participation (e.g., voting, etc.) (Olsson 
2013). She did so empirically using survey data from over 30 diverse countries 
implying that these results could be generalizable. While I will not test the 
predictive power of political interest, its power to influence the democratic health of 
a society is clearly demonstrated above. Surprisingly, there have been few studies 
specifically on political interest. 
Given the importance that political interest has for multiple facets of our 
society, it is surprising that there is a dearth of studies, which formulate their 
hypotheses using political interest as the dependent variable.  
Political interest is an under-theorized concept in political science; several 
explanations exist in the literature for its origins. This line of research 
generally focuses on individual-level characteristics (Holleque 2011) 
 
This condition causes one to wonder why political scientists do not appear 
interested in the reasons behind political interest. Research specifically studying 
why some people are interested in politics and some aren’t, is far and few between. 
Research focusing on why some countries are interested in politics and some aren’t 
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is just as rare.2  
In her graduate thesis for Princeton University, Danielle Shani, focused on 
how political interest was developed during an individual’s formative years. She 
interprets the information that individual political interest levels stay fairly 
consistent to be indicative of political attitudes being formed early in life (Shani 
2010). She found that the “seeds of political interest were planted pre-adult hood”. 
She determines that individual variables such as parental education, engagement in 
group and community activities, and an interest in social studies are the most 
important indicators of political attitudes. This is because they help us develop a 
comfort level with politics. The most interesting conclusion that she makes is that 
becoming interested in politics may not be a voluntary decision, and that a number 
of socio-economic, cultural, and demographic factors predispose certain individuals 
to be interested, or not, in politics (Shani 2010). Namely she identifies inequalities in 
resources as well as in motivation. While outside the scope of this paper, it is good 
to keep in mind that inequalities in the political sphere may be deeper than 
expected. 
Irene Martin studied the causes of the disparity in political interest between 
two European democracies, Spain and Greece, and identified three explanations for 
a country’s political interest level: historical legacy, day-to-day politics, and critical 
junctures. When examining historical legacy, the important feature is culture 
development. Critical junctures are major political/historical events that occur 
                                                        
2 The studies on why some countries have different voter participation levels in 
boundless, and although these two variables effects are intertwined, they are also 
unique. Given this uniqueness it is entirely justified to study political interest 
independent from other variables. 
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during a cohort’s lifetime; however, Dr.Shani proved that these effects were not 
significant (Shani 2010). Day-to day politics focuses on how the discourse of party 
politics is constantly changing, and that these changes can swing interest levels 
(Martin 2003). Importantly, she discovers that “the more difference citizens see 
between parties – ideological or otherwise- the more interested they will be in 
politics” (Martin 2003). However, political interest is generally considered to be a 
stable phenomenon.  Mark Prior found empirical evidence for the conclusion that in 
the aggregate, political interest is typically very stable. Occasionally, however, 
events such as a close election, a stimulating political discussion, or the fall of the 
Berlin Wall spur people’s interest (or depress it, in the case of uninspiring events). 
Yet, in the absence of major turmoil, such as German reunification, people maintain 
a very stable level of political interest relative to their fellow citizens (Prior 2010). 
The explanations behind political interest are varied, yet Mathew Holleque 
has summarized them into three distinct categories. The first explanation of political 
interest relies on individual demographics to explain levels of interest within an 
individual. Age, gender, and education have been found to be indicative of interest. 
The second is that political interest is “determined by early political socialization”. 
Whether or not an individual’s parents are politically active and political discussion 
in the home are identified as possible explanations of political interest. Finally, 
social context is used as an explanation for political interest. Eliasoph (1998) argues 
that one’s social environment can create “background knowledge for how to act and 
how to be”(Holleque 2013). For example, if an individual’s social circle discusses 
politics relatively often, then the individual is likely to be relatively more interested 
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in politics than the general populace. 
These explanations and studies primarily dealt with the formation of political 
interest on an individual level. On the other hand, my study focuses on the aggregate 
level of interest within a country and whether or not it is affected by aggregate 
country level variables. It views the reasons behind political interest with a view 
removed from the individual and with a wide lens aimed at society as a whole. This 
should help us identify which aggregate country variables are indicative of political 
interest within a country. This should aid attempts to explain why some countries 
are more interested in politics than others.  
 
Political Participation 
As stated by Sidney Verba and Almond Nye (1967:1), “citizen participation 
lies at the heart of democracy”. It is when we vote, protest, sign petitions, or contact 
elected officials that our desires, needs, and wants are communicated (Olsson 
2013).  Finding country’s level variables that could help explain the level of citizen 
participation is therefore fruitful and rewarding for the study of democracy and 
countries wishing to become democracies. 
While there are some direct forms or participation within democracies “ the 
size and scale of states dictate that…participation will be limited to voting for 
representatives, petitioning, influencing public opinion, participating in public 
hearings, and protesting” (Warren 2003). Most individuals only go to the polls 
during the most salient elections; hence we are left with non-institutionalized 
participation as the only other form of engaging in democratic politics. Given that it 
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is a principle method through which citizens relay their policy desires to 
representatives and the method by which citizens are likely to hold poor politicians 
accountable to these desires, it is important to understand the factors behind 
political participation. 
A society that is more likely to engage in politics is also more likely to 
experience greater equality, as the playing field is made more equal as more people 
participate because the influence of the elite is disperse. Furthermore, public policy, 
in a society where the populace is more likely to engage in politics, is more likely to 
reflect the outcomes desired by the public. 
The reasons why an individual participates can vary greatly are “it is likely to 
be issue based, segmented by sector, and be distributed among many different kinds 
of venues”(Warren 2003). Given the uncertainty of what truly motivates one to 
engage in politics and what motivates his peers, this study will not focus on 
participation on an individual level. Instead, it will measure aggregate levels of 
participation to get an impression for the propensity for political action within a 
society. Furthermore, attempting to establish a relationship between aggregate non-
institutionalized participation and country level variables was fruitful, while 
attempting the same analysis on an individual level would prove difficult. 
Political participation is a result of political efficacy. Individuals are more 
likely to participate when they feel that their time will be spent effectively. It will be 
interesting to see if country level variables affect this political efficacy. My 
hypothesis is that country level variables will have a greater effect on participation 
than they will on interest level.  
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Methods and Data 
I will be preforming a cross-national explanatory analysis of the country level 
variables behind political interest in a country. I will also be preforming the same 
analyses with the political action index, which is explained below in the dependent 
variable section. 
Possible Explanatory Variables and the Supporting Theory 
This section summarizes the institutional and political variables that are 
indicative of a country’s democratic and societal status and health.  These variables 
also could have an effect on the level of political interest within a country and the 
country’s political action index score. I will also explain the theory and logic that is 
represented in the literature. The variables I have chosen include: corruption level, 
wealth inequality, democracy score, press freedom score, individual income, 
Internet and infrastructure, and education. 
Corruption has long been a subject of study of both political scientists and 
economists. Its negative economic effects are well documented. They include 
lowering total investment, deterring FDI, corruption increases pollution (Erbert 
2004), corruption significantly reduces trust in civil servants, and corruption is also 
seen to increase crime levels (Lambsdorff 1999). The causes of corruption are well 
outside the scope of this paper but are often found in variables measuring 
government size and decentralization, institutional quality, political and economic 
competition, recruitment and salaries, press freedom, and judiciary, democracy and 
political system, cultural determinants. (Lambsdorff 1999) Instead of the traditional 
economic consequences of corruption, I will concentrate on the effects it may have 
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on a country’s democratic health e.g. political interest level and political engagement 
Corruption level will be measured using Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI).  
 
The CPI scores and ranks countries/territories based on how corrupt a 
country’s public sector is perceived to be. It is a composite index, a 
combination of surveys and assessments of corruption, collected by a variety 
of reputable institutions. The CPI is the most widely used indicator of 
corruption worldwide.  
 
It is important to note that the CPI measures the perceived level of 
corruption rather than the actual number of deviant actions by politicians. They 
explain why 
Corruption generally comprises illegal activities, which are deliberately 
hidden and only come to light through scandals, investigations or 
prosecutions. There is no meaningful way to assess absolute levels of 
corruption in countries or territories on the basis of hard empirical data. 
Possible attempts to do so, such as by comparing bribes reported, the 
number of prosecutions brought or studying court cases directly linked to 
corruption cannot be taken as definitive indicators of corruption levels. 
Instead, they show how effective prosecutors, the courts or the media are 
in investigating and exposing corruption. Capturing perceptions of 
corruption of those in a position to offer assessments of public sector 
corruption is the most reliable method of comparing relative corruption 
levels across countries.3  
 
To further illustrate this point, imagine measuring corruption with a 
quantitative measure, such as the number of public officials convicted of corrupt 
behavior. Now imagine this hypothetical situation: the United States has convicted 
20 politicians of corruption in the last ten years while Nigeria has only convicted 
one. Does this mean that the U.S. experiences higher levels of corruption than 
Nigeria, perhaps, but it more likely points to the conclusion that the U.S. judicial 
                                                        
3 Explanations of the CPI from transparency international’s website 
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/in_detail#myAnchor1 
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system is more willing or capable of prosecuting corruption. Galtung and Kauffman 
support this argument claiming, “Perceptions matter because agents base their 
actions on their perceptions, impressions and views” (Galtung et al. 2006, Kauffman 
et al 2007). Therefore, this study will not distinguish between petty and grand 
corruption nor measure documented occurrences, but will rather focus solely on the 
total level of perceived corruption within a country. 
Corruption is a pariah for a healthy democracy. “Corruption undermines the 
powers of voting and speaking that people can use to influence collective 
decisions—the very powers that define democracy. It removes public contestation 
into non-public channels of influence” (Warren 2009), and it has recently become 
prevalent in the political science literature. “One body of research has shown that 
corruption undermines participation in the political process, which is an essential 
part of a thriving democracy (e.g. Karahan et al. 2006; Kostadinova 2009). To 
underline this point, Stockemer et al. (2003) find that turnout is up to 10 points 
higher in transparent countries as compared to corrupt countries”(Stockemer 
2003). The results of this mechanism described above have been proven empirically 
by a few studies. Anderson and Tverdova (2003) provide results that show that 
corruption significantly affects people’s evaluations of their political system’s 
performance and the trustworthiness of civil servants. These results are supported 
by the concurring findings of another likeminded study by Wagner et al. (2009). 
Stockemer et al. (2013) also came to the same conclusion when they found:  
Countries that suffer from higher macro-levels of corruption have, in the 
aggregate, fewer citizens that are content with the way democracy works in 
their country. 
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 Leading to the conclusion that “There is some rather solid evidence that corruption 
decreases citizens’ satisfaction with their democratic system” (Stockemer, D., 
Sundström, A 2013). 
Corruption has been found to be both negatively and positively correlated 
with voter participation (Stockemer et al. 2013).  
One reason offered for why corruption increases turnout is that rent-seeking 
and misuse of public office through for example bribe taking and soliciting 
leads to higher expected returns of staying in office, which leads the 
incumbents as well as the candidates challenging the incumbents to put more 
money and effort into their campaigns, which then mobilizes voters and 
leads to higher turnout rates (Karahanet al., 2006, 2009, Escaleraset al.2012). 
A different argument for why the presence of corruption should increase 
turnout is that voters are mobilized on ‘clean government’ issues 
The counter-argument, that is, that the presence of corruption decreases 
turnout, is made from the perspective that corruption corrodes the political 
system (Warren 2004) which leads to general cynicism, distrust and voter 
apathy (Andersen and Tverdova, 2003,Bauhr and Grimes, 2013). 
 
I would like to see which of these relationships is present with corruption 
and political interest and participation levels within a country. My hypothesis is that 
higher levels of corruption will decrease interest in politics within a country, as 
citizens will feel helpless to change the system if they view that system as corrupt. 
Furthermore, this could create a vicious feedback loop that further exacerbates both 
the problem of low political interest and high levels of corruption.  This is because 
as the populace becomes less interested in politics, a longer leash is given to 
politicians to engage in illegal behavior. When they engage in illegal behavior, 
interest is further decreased and so on. The results of my study should lend support 
to one school of thought or the other. 
Furthermore, this lack of trust in the political system manifests as a decrease 
in political action. Citizens’ disillusionment and lack of interest discourages them 
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from engaging in any sort of contention4.  This leads to the hypothesis that 
corruption will also be negatively correlated with the political action index. Besides 
being detrimental to the political system within a country, corruption has a 
multitude of other negative effects on a country. Understanding corruption’s 
relationship to political interest and political engagement will help improve our 
ability to combat it. 
While Stockemer found nuanced relationships between macro-level 
corruption and the influence it has on citizens’ satisfaction with democracy, there 
are several differences between his study and my own. The first is that my sample 
includes a vast array of countries from each continent, while he only tested 
developed European countries. Also significant to note, is that we are using different 
measures of corruption. He used the World Bank’s control for corruption indicator 
which measures corruption from -2.5 to 2.5 this only provides for 50 variations 
while the CPI is measured from 0-100 providing for twice degree of variance and 
measuring corruption more accurately.  
We find that macro-level corruption trends are a good predictor of aggregate 
satisfaction with democracy ratings. However, these macro-trends are rather 
irrelevant for individuals’ assessment of the performance of democracy. 
Rather than overall corruption, it is citizens’ personal perceptions of petty 
corruption that impacts their regime evaluations (Stockemer et al. 2013). 
 
Wealth inequality in a country will be measured using the Gini coefficient, 
which measures the gap between high and low incomes within a country. High 
levels of inequality have been associated with low levels of voter turnout. “Solt 
shows that income inequality associates negatively with electoral participation, 
                                                        
4 This relationship between corruption, interest level, and political action will be 
explored below. 
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while higher income people tend to vote relatively more as inequality rises”(Horn 
2010).  I would like to determine if high levels of inequality also decrease political 
interest. It could be hypothesized that high levels of inequality could lead to greater 
interest in politics as the populace would want to increase the redistribution level. 
However, I hypothesize that high levels of inequality, like corruption, will be 
negatively associated with political interest. Also like corruption inequality also has 
the chance to create a feedback loop and exacerbate both problems. This hypothesis 
is supported by the fact that “Schäfer corroborates Anderson’s and Singer’s finding 
and reports that high income inequality makes individuals less satisfied with the 
way the democracy works in their country.” (Stockemer et al 2013) When the 
populace is less satisfied with the way democracy works it is likely they will be less 
interested in politics. Likewise, if they are dissatisfied with the way their institutions 
function, it is reasonable to conclude that they would be less likely to engage in 
politics as well. 
I will also measure how the average individual wealth within a society 
correlates with an interest in politics and the political action index. I will test this 
using GDP per a capita and GNI per a capita. The level of wealth individuals have 
determines how they are able to allocate their time. Individuals who have met their 
basic security needs will be more likely to engage in politics than those who are 
struggling to eat. The following finding supports my hypothesis. “More affluent 
citizens tend to report a higher satisfaction with democracy “(e.g. Gulbrandtsen and 
Skaning 2010; Wells and Krieckhaus 2006; Blais and Gélineau 2007; Schäfer 2010). 
It would follow that you are more likely to be interested in something you are 
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satisfied with than something you are dissatisfied with. This is indirectly supported 
by the fact that voting is strong predicated by socio-economic status (Geys 2006b; 
Lijphart 1997; Blais 2006; Gallego 2007) I will test this hypothesis empirically. 
Democracy will be measured by the Freedom House index, which rates a 
country’s level of democracy from 1 to 7(with 7 being the worst) and the Economist 
Intelligence Unit, which rates a country’s level of Democracy from 1 to 10(with ten 
being the best). I will test the hypothesis that higher levels of democracy lead to 
higher levels of political interest and engagement, while simultaneously testing if 
citizens in autocratic states are less interested and engaged in politics. 
I will also be using Freedom House’s index for Freedom of the Press to 
measure journalistic freedom within a country. The ability for journalists to report 
truthful, unbiased news can go a long way to improving political interest in a 
country. Given that it would be hard to become interested in information if its 
validity cannot be determined. It would follow that participating in politics would 
also be made more difficult. 
The infrastructure index is representative of the overall physical 
development with a country. I hypothesize that the level of infrastructure will be 
positively correlated with the level of interest in society as information is spread 
more easily and individuals are more readily able to travel. I also predict that the 
coefficient and significance will be greater for the political action index and 
infrastructure. The ability for individuals to organize and gather could be severely 
hampered by deficits in infrastructure. 5 Likewise, greater Internet access will allow 
                                                        
5 This index was measured/constructed for the Kiel Institute. 
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for easier access to information. Furthermore, it is also indicative of the 
development level of a country. Smith et Al. found that individuals 
 
Who use blogs or social networking sites politically are much more likely to 
be invested in other forms of civic and political activism. Compared to those 
who go online but do not post political or social content or to those who do 
not go online in the first place“(Smith et al. 2011) 
 
However, it is not just online political activity that indicates outside 
participation, as one could reasonably assume an individual posting political content 
online would be more likely to participate offline as well. Tom Bakker of the 
University of Amsterdam found that a variety of Internet uses are positively related 
with different forms of political participation (Bakker et al. 2011). Just as with the 
infrastructure index, I hypothesize that higher levels of Internet access will also be 
associated with higher levels of political interest and political participation within a 
country. 
Population demographics will be measured by the percent of the population 
within a country that lives in an urban setting as measured by the World Bank. I 
hypothesize that countries that have more urban populations will have higher levels 
of political interest as well as higher propensities for political action. The logic 
behind this is that urban populations communicate, organize, and are subject to 
more information than their rural counterparts. 
Finally, I will test the relationship between the education level in a country 
and my dependent variables. I will use three measurements to indicate the 
education level in a country and see if the same correlation persists with all three. 
The first will be the percent of the university age population that is enrolled in 
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tertiary education. The second will be the percentage of GDP that the government 
spends on primary education. The third will be an education index as measured by 
the World Bank. By using three different measurements of education, I should be 
able to determine the effect different levels of education have on my dependent 
variables. For example if there is a high correlation between percentage of 
population attending some university and political interest, but that correlation is 
absent with the percentage of the population only having graduated primary school, 
it can be determined that higher education is an important factor for creating 
political interest. Stockemer’s finding that education was a strong indicator of 
satisfaction with democracy supports this hypothesis. In his study, higher levels of 
education indicated higher levels of satisfaction with democracy. I will see if the 
same relationships hold for education and political interest and participation 
empirically. 
Dependent Variables 
I will be using two grpa to measure the level of political interest in a country. 
The first will be the raw % of the populace that is “very interested” in politics with 
consideration to the sum of the population that is “somewhat interest”, “not very 
interested”, and “not interested at all” in politics. This will measure the acuteness of 
the interest in politics within a country. The second will be the sum of the populace 
that responded to the World Value Survey question “how interested you are in 
politics” with either “very interested” or “somewhat interested” this will measure 
the overall level of interest within a country. 
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The importance of the World Value Survey (WVS) cannot be understated. It 
provides homogenous research methods across countries, which stipulates more 
robust results. Previous studies have had to rely on collaborations of survey data to 
measure the level of interest within a country, or they were limited to regional 
studies. It also provides a fairly large number of variables, measuring the level of 
interest in politics in 59 countries. This large N value entails a very extensive survey, 
and the large N value will make the results more generalizable than other studies on 
the level of interest in politics.6 
The second variable I will be examining will be the Political Action Index. 
This index I have created myself to represent the four different forms of political 
action measured by the WVS.  The individual coefficients and p-values for each of 
the questions are displayed in table 4. This will measure the propensity for a society 
to engage in some type of political action as measured by the average percent of the 
population that said they that they have or would participate in some form of 
political action. These values were found using the responses to the following World 
Value Survey questions.” whether you have done any of these things, whether you 
might do it or would never under any circumstances do it: sign a petition, joining in 
boycotts, attending peaceful demonstrations, and joining strikes”.   Each of these 
variables is considered non-institutionalized participation.  
My selection of these four variables to construct the political action index is 
supported by Sofia Olsson’s, at the University of Gothenburg, decision to use very 
similar measures. She constructed her non-institutionalized participation index 
                                                        
6 The entire list of countries and variables can be found in the excel spreadsheet 
beneath the appendix. 
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using four participation items: (1) signing a petition, (2) boycotting or deliberately 
buying products for political, ethical or environmental reasons, (3) joining an 
internet political forum or (4) taking part in a demonstration. I have included 
joining a strike instead of joining an Internet political forum. I did not have the 
option to include joining a political forum as an option as; the WVS survey does not 
measure this variable. Fortunately, I do not consider joining a forum much political 
action and thus believe that the percentage of the population willing to or having 
joined a strike is much more representative of a populace’s propensity for political 
action anyhow. Despite this deviation, the fact that she includes these identical 3 
measures lends credibility to my index. 
This variable provides the link between an interest in politics and the actual 
willingness and ability to engage in political action. It is representative of the real 
world implications of the interest level in politics. It will be interesting to note if 
country level variables relate to political action and political interest in the same 
way. 
The World Values Survey is again very important. It provides homogenous 
research methods across countries, which stipulates more robust results.7. It also 
provides a fairly large number of variables, measuring the level of interest in politics 
in 59 countries. This creates a more extensive survey of political participation, and 
the large N value will make the results more generalizable than the studies on 
political interest and participation that measured less countries. 
 
                                                        
7 See ISSP module citizenship (Olsson 2013) 
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Methods 
These relationships should provide interesting results about what variables 
are important for predicting an interest in politics and political participation for a 
country. First I created scatter plots with basic fit lines showing the rudimentary 
relationships between my independent variables and the percentage of the 
population that is very interested in politics and the political action index. I then ran 
OLS regressions for each of my dependent variables, as well as several control 
variables, using the statistical program Stata. The regression results will show 
whether or not the relationships are statistically significant and the magnitude of 
their predictive power. These results will be displayed beneath the graphical results. 
My study differs from the previous research by measuring a larger number of 
countries than most of the previous studies regarding political interest, satisfaction 
with democracy, or non-institutionalized participation. While previous studies 
focused primarily on Europe and developed democracies, my study measures 
countries as diverse as France and Pakistan. I am expanding the case set to consider 
a more diverse set of countries. This provides a more holistic picture of the effect 
country level variables have on my dependent variables of interest and 
participation. It will add to the scant literature regarding political interest, as most 
studies up to this point have focuses solely on participation. The same is true for this 
study supporting the literature on political action. Thus, it should prove worthwhile 
for the study of democracy as whole, in addition to adding to the literature 
regarding its components  
Potential issues: 
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The most salient issue for the applicability of my study is the fact that I have 
only tested one period of time. This may lead a reader to consider these results 
irrelevant or less significant as they were only measured in one time period. 
However, I believe that each of my independent variables generally change slowly 
with time. Of course there can be shocks to a system, but generally a country does 
not become rich, educated, developed or oppressive overnight.  Rothstein supports 
this conclusion for corruption, when he concludes previous research on corruption’s 
persistence as “once the system gets there, it stays there”(Rothstein 2011). 
Bivariate Graphical Analysis Results:   
I have constructed scatter plots to illustrate the relationships, between my 
dependent variables (percentage of population very interested in politics and the 
Political action index) and my independent variables. In addition several of the 
variables illustrated below will be tested using different measurements of the same 
variable in the regressions portion of my paper. For example, currently I have only 
used the Economist’s Intelligence Scores for my measure of democracy level within 
a country, but I also test the robustness of the relationship using another measure of 
democracy in a regression analysis. I have included each graph with a short analysis 
below. These are visual representations of the regression results that will be 
displayed later in the paper. The line is the “line of best fit” calculated by excel which 
shows the general direction of the relationship.  
 
 
 
 Figure 18 
In this graph I have plotted countries’ data of political interest against the 
measure level of perceived corruption in a country
International. A country with a score of 0 
would indicate highest level of perceived corruption.  This graph demonstrates a 
slightly negative correlation between corruption
That is to say, that according to this data as a country
the percentage of the population that is very interested in politics also decreases. This 
                                                       
8 This graph shows a negative line that seems to not fit the data. However this is due 
to clumping of countries in the bottom left of the graph with high levels of 
corruption and few people very interested in politics.
9 For the purpose of political interest, I am of the 
corruption is more relatable to political interest than actual instances of corruption 
because a citizen will be considering the level of corruption they perceive when 
deciding whether or not to be interested in politics
perceptions was also explained above.
9 measured by Transparency 
is the least corrupt, while a score of 
 improvement and political interest. 
’s level of corruption decreases 
 
 
opinion that the level of perceived 
. The logic behind using 
 
29
 
100 
 is contradictory to my hypothesis that political interest would increase with decreases 
in corruption, and makes the finding that corruption is negatively correlated with 
voter participation more robust (
significant correlation this graph does tell us that the relationship between corruption 
and political interest varies between countries. That is too say that citizens in some 
countries respond to instances of corruption by becoming more engaged in politics, 
while in other countries the electorate becomes even more resigned and disillusioned 
with politics. The reasons behind the dichotomy in responses to corruption most likely 
lie in the unique cultural, socio
and would provide an interesting
Figure 2 
This graph demonstrates the relationship
and Transparency International Corruption Perceptions index. It illustrates a 
Stockemer et al. 2013).  Although, there is not a 
-demographic, and political situations of each
 avenue for further research. 
 between the political action index 
30
 country 
 
 positive relationship between the 
political action. This implies that citizens in less corrupt countries are more likely to 
engage in politics rather than those countries that are more corrupt. The dichotomy 
of the relationship between corruption/interest and corruption/action is intrigu
as one may expect these relationships to demonstrate the same direction.  
 
Figure 3 
The above graph displays the percent of the population very interested in 
politics compared to the 2012 democracy scores measured by the Economist 
Intelligence Unit. A score of 10 represents the highest level of democracy, while a 
score of zero represents the lowest level of democracy. Again, this graph is 
contradictory to the hypothesis I proposed ear
political interest would have a positive correlation with levels of democracy. This 
absence of corruption and the propensity fo
 
lier in my methods sections, that 
31
r 
ing 
 
 surprising result could be made more robust with a larger sample size, as the 
majority of the countries sampled could not be considered st
example, by eliminating two outliers, Bahrain and Egypt, the correlat
slightly positive, as demonstrated by the below graph. 
Figure 4 
This leads to the conclusion that more data must be collecte
level of democracy and the number of countries where political interest has been 
measured. This graph does point to the interesting conclusion that citizens in 
autocratic countries or countries without full civil liberties can be equally as
interested in politics as citizens in developed 
much for how interesting government is, it does say that different government types 
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 are just as interesting to the electorate. If this holds true, it would be problematic
conclusions that political efficacy leads to greater political interest
Figure 5 
This graph depicts the relationship between the propensity for political 
action amongst countries citizens
score for that country. The line of best fit illuminates a positive correlation between 
the level of democracy in a country and the citizens of that country’s willingness to 
engage in politics. This means 
political action will increase.
 
 
 and the Economist’s Intelligence Unit’s democracy 
that as democracy improves the propensity for 
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 Figure 6 
This graph displays interest in politics versus the level of press freedom in a 
country as measured by Reporters Without Borders. A score of 
least amount of freedom for the press 
freedom for the press. Once again, this graph displays a relationship that diverges 
from my original hypothesis. It demonstrates a marginally negative relations
between press freedom and the
Perhaps this could be due to the necessity of higher levels of political interest in 
order to gather relevant information about politics in an oppressive society. In 
addition many of the outliers tend to be former soviet satellites 
transitions to democracy, explaining
y = 0.0172x + 11.354
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hip 
. 
 
 increases in political interest yet still have archaic soviet 
information.  
 
Figure 7 
This graph represents the relationship between the freedom of the press and 
the political action index. This graph illustrates a 
press freedom and the propensity for political action. 
relationship is present between press suppression and the political action index. 
That is to say as a country’s citizens 
non-state sponsored news they are 
could be due to citizens being more informed about poorly preforming politicians 
and bureaucrats when the press is free and fair
 
systems that repress 
positive relationship between 
This means that a negative 
lose greater access to independently verifiable, 
less likely to engage in political action. This 
. 
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 Figure 8 
This graph shows the relationship between the 
with a high political interest and inequality, measured by the GINI coefficient, within 
society. Although slight, this graph demonstrates a relationship that is in line with 
my original hypothesis that political interest would decrease as dispar
income increased within a country. A reasonable explanation for this is that 
individuals become disillusioned with the political system as inequality grows. An 
individual is less likely to be interested in a system that they do not believe is 
working in their favor. 
 
 
percentage of the 
ities in 
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population 
 Figure 9 
 This graph illustrates the relationship between the political action index and 
inequality, as measured by the GINI coefficient. It demonstrates the slightest 
negative relationship between inequalit
fact it would not be hard to argue that this graph demonstrates a complete lack of 
relationship between inequality and the propensity for political engagement
somewhat surprising as one might figure th
societies would be clamoring for more rights. However, that does not seem to be the 
case. This graph seems to direct us to the conclusion that citizens in equal countries 
are as likely to engage in political action a
 
 
 
 
y and the propensity for political action. In 
at disadvantaged individuals in unequal 
s citizens in unequal countries.
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. This is 
 
 Figure 10  
This graph displays the level of political interest in a country as a measure of 
the Gross enrolment ratio in tertiary education with in a country. It demonstrates a 
negative relationship betwe
population very interested in politics within a country. This is very surprising given 
that education is usually seen as a positive predictor of participation and interest.
                                                       
10 Explored further in the appendix
en tertiary enrollment and the percentage of the 
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 Figure 11 
This figure illustrates the relationship between the polit
the percent of the population eligible for tertiary enrollment enrolled.
scatter plot shows a positive relationship between the percentage
enrolled and the propensity for political action within that country. One explanation 
for the phenomenon that the political action index correlates in the opposite 
direction of interest could be that individual psychological factors play
example, an individual may 
political powering occurring and eventually become
at the same time he learns about the avenues to express one
system and is still more likely to engage in politics than someone who is more 
interested but who has not attended any tertiary education.
ical action index and 
 The above 
 of the population 
 a role. For 
graduate college become more aware of the abuses of 
 uninterested in the system. Yet, 
’s discontent with th
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 Figure 12 
This graph depicts the relationship between the % of the population very 
interested in politics within a country and the education index measured by the 
World Bank. It portrays a negative relationship between the percent of the 
population very interested in politics and the education index. This, as with the 
graph above, is surprising due to the expected effects of increased education. The 
regression results will prove if this relationship is robust.
 
 
40
  
 
Figure 13 
The above graph indicates the relationship between the political action index 
and the education index measured by the World Bank. The above figure exhibits a 
positive relationship between the education index and the propensity for political 
action within a country. That is to say that as the education index rises for a nation, 
their citizens will more readily engage in the political arena
 
 
. 
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 Figure 14 
This graph displays the relationship between the % of the population that is 
very interested in politics and the average individual wealth in society measured by 
GDP per Capita. The two variables demonstrate a positive relationship in the graph 
above.  
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 Figure 15 
The above graph illustrates the relationship between the average individual 
wealth within a society as measured by GDP per a capita
society to engage in political action. It demonstrates a positive relationship between 
the two variables. This makes intuitive sense. Given that people face trade
do their best to make rational decisions, individuals w
likely to engage in an activity that is only indirectly related to well
example imagine an individual living in Ecuador making on average a little over 
5000 dollars a year, that individual is much less likely to take 
petition or attend a demonstration over racial inequality than an individual making 
43,000 dollars in Germany (
 
 and the propensity for that 
ith more wealth are more 
- being. As an 
the time to sign a 
ceteris paribus of course). 
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-offs and 
  
 
 
Figure 16 
 
This graph illustrates a pos
population very interested in politics and the infrastructure level within that 
country. It shows that on average a country with a higher level of infrastructure will 
have relatively more citizens that are very interested in politics. 
information traveling more easily in these countries, or that politicians are able to 
visit more remote areas of their region due to transportation advancements.
itive relationship between the percentage
This could be due to 
44
 
 of the 
 
 Figure 17 
 
 This graph illustrates a positive 
infrastructure within a county and the propensity for its citizens to engage in civic 
action. This is not unexpected as better infrastructure allows for better 
communication as well as ease of transport. To illustrate this
it would be for an individual living in Kandahar province desiring to attend a 
demonstration in Kabul to make it there in a timely fashion. Now, imagine you
hypothetical vehemently pro
drive to attend marches in D.C. The level of infrastructure in a country has a direct 
effect on the actual ability to engage in political action. The significance of this 
relationship will be tested using regression analysis below.
 
Preliminary results Conclusion:
relationship between the level of 
, imagine how difficult 
-choice neighbor who regularly makes the 10
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 Interestingly the country level variables tend to show greater relationships 
with the political action index than they do with the percent of the population very 
interested in politics. Furthermore, the lack of relationship between some country 
level variables and interest was unexpected. This was especially true for the 
democracy level and the education measurements used. I had predicted that both of 
these for would be strong indicators of interest; however that does not seem to be 
the case. This most likely means that the country level variables play a larger role in 
determining whether or not an individual has the actual ability to engage in politics. 
Two of the independent variables, infrastructure and GDP per Capita, showed the 
same relationship with both of the dependent variables and was positive. These 
results also hold true in the following section adding to their level of robustness. 
Finally, it was unexpected that corruption displayed opposing relationships with the 
political action index and the percentage of the population very interested in 
politics. I do not expect this relationship to hold for the entire sum of the interested 
population.  
These graphs represent rudimentary relationships between my interest and 
participation variables and various independent variables. However, many of these 
variables both dependent and independent may be highly correlated with one 
another. Hence, these relationships may be oversimplifications of the true 
relationships present. Therefore, I run multiple regression analyses to paint a more 
nuanced patterned of the predictive patterns of political interest and participation. 
Dependent Variable Codes 
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Very Interested - value determined by the percentage of a country’s population 
which answered the World Value Survey question “how interested you are in 
politics?” with very interested 
Somewhat Interested - value determined by the percentage of a country’s 
population, which answered the World Value Survey question “how interested you 
are in politics?” with Somewhat Interested 
Sum of Total Interest Level - value determined by adding the total number of 
individuals who said they were either very interested in politics or somewhat 
interested in politics. 
Political Action Index (PAI) – value determined by the average percentage of the 
population that would engage in some form of political action. Based on the values 
reported by the World Value Survey 
Independent Variable Codes 
Corruption Level (TICI) - Transparency International Corruption Index. It is a 
composite index, a combination of surveys and assessments of corruption, collected 
by a variety of reputable institutions measuring the perceived level of corruption 
within the public sector11 
Freedom House Freedom Score- Freedom House’s Freedom Rating as provided by 
Freedom House. It is a measure of how oppressive a regime is. The lower the score 
the freer a country is. 
                                                        
11 http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/in_detail#myAnchor2 
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EIUDemocracyScore – Value determined by the Economist’s Intelligence Unit’s 
democracy rating for a given country. The higher the score the more democratic a 
country is. 
Freedom of the Press – This is a measure of how free/fair/open the media is 
within a country. The value is determined by Reporters Without Borders. Higher 
values are associated with more press suppression and control. 
DEM – This is a binary variable for whether or not a country could be considered a 
democracy and is provided by Freedom House 
GDP –Gross domestic product. Value provided by the World Bank 
GDP per Capita – Gross domestic product per a capita. Value provided by the World 
Bank 
Inequality (Gini) - The Gini index, the “de jour” measure of inequality within a 
country. It measures the gap between the proportion of wealth owned by a 
percentage of the population and what their wealth would be with complete 
equality. The value is determined by a country’s Lorenz curve and has been 
provided by the World Bank.  
Education Index – This is an education index calculated using “mean years of 
schooling” and “expected years of schooling”. The United Nations Development 
Program has provided it with their Human Development Reports. 
HDI – Human Development Index. Value determined by the United Nations 
Development Program. 
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Gross National Income - GNI per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). 
PPP GNI is gross national income (GNI) converted to international dollars using 
purchasing power parity rates. Value determined by the World Bank. 
Expenditure on Public Schools- Public expenditure on education as the 
percentage of total government expenditure is the total public education 
expenditure (current and capital) expressed as a percentage of total government 
expenditure for all sectors in a given financial year. Public education expenditure 
includes government spending on educational institutions (both public and private), 
education administration, and subsidies for private entities (students/households 
and other private entities). The World Bank provides this value. 
Internet Use – Value determined by the number of Internet users out of 100, data 
provided by the World Bank. 
Tertiary Enrollment Ratio – “Total is the total enrollment in tertiary education, 
regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the total population of the five-year 
age group following on from secondary school leaving”. (World Bank) Value 
provided by the World Bank 
Urban Population percentage – “Urban population refers to people living in urban 
areas as defined by national statistical offices. It is calculated using World Bank 
population estimates and urban ratios from the United Nations World Urbanization 
Prospects.”  The World Bank provides this value. 
Infrastructure Index- Constructed using variables measuring the level of transport, 
energy, finance, and information and communication technology within a country. 
This value is provided by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy. 
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Data Sources 
 
1. Reporters Without Borders 
2. Transparency International 
3. World Value Survey 
4. World Bank 
5. Freedom House 
6. Economist Intelligence Unit 
7. United Nations Development Program 
8. Kiel Institute for the World Economy 
 
 
Initial Regression Results – the result tables of a basic, no controls, regression for 
each of my dependent variables with the country level variables I have collected. 
 
Table 1: Bivariate regression models predicting Very interested in politics 
Dependent Variable Magnitude 
  
Significance 
Very Interested Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
Independent Variables 
    EIU Democracy Score -0.28721 0.4434934 -0.65 0.520 
Freedom of the Press 0.017859 0.0593132 0.30 0.764 
Democracy -2.81349 1.820376 -1.55 0.128 
Corruption Level -0.0265794 0.0443461 -0.60 0.551 
Unpaid Parking Tickets .06990000 0.0218598 3.20 .0020 
GDP 2.590E-13 3.65E-13 0.71 0.480 
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Table 1 analysis: This table displays the regression results using VeryINT as a 
dependent variable and the country level factor variables as independent variables 
As evidenced by the P-values in the far right column there are very few statistically 
significant correlations between the independent variables and the proportion of 
the population very interested in politics below the traditional .05 measure of 
significance. The two variables that do are the infrastructure index and the number 
of unpaid parking tickets received by a country’s officials. However, the relationship 
between tertiary enrollment and the proportion of the population “very interested 
in politics” is statistically significant at the looser requirement of .1. 12 It was 
                                                        
12 This will be addressed in the appendix section 
GDP per Capita 9.830E-06 0.0000452 0.22 0.829 
Gini -0.0173313 0.1021138 -0.17 0.866 
Education Index -8.119688 6.541584 -1.24 0.220 
HDI -10.537 7.631382 -1.38 0.173 
Gross National Income 0.0000163 0.0000427 0.38 0.704 
Expenditure on Public Schools 0.1236768 0.1892871 0.65 0.517 
Internet use -0.0247296 0.0384969 -0.64 0.523 
Tertiary Enrollment Ration -0.0636992 0.0356992 -1.78 0.081 
Urban Population -0.0651223 0.0414311 -1.57 0.122 
Infrastructure Index 0.0699431 0.0218598 3.20 0.002 
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surprising that very few of the country level variables I selected demonstrate 
statistically significant relationships with the population very interested. Especially 
surprising was the lack of relationship between the level of democracy and the 
percent of the population very interested in politics. One would expect that 
developed democracies would contain the highest percentage of individuals highly 
interested in politics as they have had the longest time to develop a cultural 
influence amongst society members. However, at the point in time measured in this 
study it appears that citizens living in autocratic countries are just as likely to be 
very interested in the political system as those residing in residing in Western 
Europe. 
 
Table 2: Bivariate regresion models predicting Somewhat or Very Interested in Politics 
Dependent Variable Magnitude 
  
Significance 
Sum of Total Interest Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
Independent Variables 
    Freedom House Score 0.8865511 0.9844641 0.90 0.372 
EIU Democracy Score -0.1647101 0.9169689 -0.18 0.858 
Freedom of the Press 0.0526698 0.1221109 0.43 0.668 
Democracy -6.276587 3.738475 -1.68 0.099 
Corruption 0.0866815 0.090933 0.95 0.345 
Unpaid Parking Tickets .093696 .0465829 2.01 0.050 
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GDP 9.88E-13 7.42E-13 1.33 0.189 
GDP per Capita 0.0001963 0.0000893 2.20 0.032 
Gini -0.2489832 0.2171023 -1.15 0.257 
Education index -6.322537 13.61924 -0.46 0.644 
HDI -3.068704 15.96529 -0.19 0.848 
Gross National Income 0.0001731 0.0000849 2.04 0.046 
Expenditure on Public Schools -0.0569059 0.4254413 -0.13 0.894 
Internet use 0.0237262 0.079436 0.30 0.766 
Tertiary Enrollment Ratio -0.0684017 0.0757841 -0.90 0.371 
Urban Population -0.0758533 0.0865316 -0.88 0.385 
Infrastructure Index 4.699773 1.484195 3.17 0.003 
 
Table 2 analyses: This table displays the regression results using SumINT as a 
dependent variable and the country level factor variables as independent variables. 
There are two statistically significant relationships present, although they tell the 
same story. Gross National Income per capita (PPP) and GDP per a capita are both 
display statistically significant relationships with the total proportion of the 
population with an interest in politics at the traditional measure of significance .05. 
This could mean that individual wealth plays a large role in determining whether or 
not an individual is interested in politics. What is also interesting to note is that the 
sum of the interest level correlates in a different direction with corruption than the 
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percentage of the population very interested in politics. The other reversals in 
direction involve the expenditure on public schools and the number of Internet 
users. Access to the Internet shows a slight negative correlation with the percentage 
of the population very interested in politics while here it demonstrates a positive 
coefficient. Likewise the relationship between expenditure on public schools and the 
sum of the total interest in society is negative while it demonstrates a positive 
relationship with the percentage of the population very interested in politics. 
Table 3: Bivariate regresion models predicting propensity for political action 
Dependent Variable Magnitude 
  
Significance 
Political Action Index Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
Independent Variables 
    Freedom House Score -3.153757 0.5270334 -5.98 0.000 
EIU Democracy Score 3.186248 0.4718887 6.75 0.000 
Freedom of the Press -0.3335553 0.0678753 -4.91 0.000 
Democracy 11.50071 2.014722 5.71 0.000 
Corruption 0.2823635 0.0475858 5.93 0.000 
GDP 1.02E-12 4.62E-13 2.21 0.032 
GDP per Capita 0.000381 0.0000544 7.00 0.000 
Gini -0.0075823 0.1410539 -0.05 0.957 
Education Index 26.28903 7.981416 3.29 0.002 
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HDI 34.58941 9.315185 3.71 0.001 
Gross National Income 0.0004303 0.0000749 5.75 0.000 
Expenditure on Public Schools -0.016912 0.2740249 -0.06 0.951 
Internet use 0.1927685 0.0454598 4.24 0.000 
Tertiary Enrollment Ratio 0.1669924 0.0449192 3.72 0.001 
Urban Population 0.1136152 0.0593279 1.92 0.061 
Infrastructure Index 3.49973 .9327106 3.75 0.000 
 
Table 4 analyses: This table displays the regression results using the political action 
index as a dependent variable and the country level factor variables as independent 
variables. The above chart displays numerous statistically significant relationships 
between country level factors and the propensity for a society to engage in political 
action. This leads one to believe that country level factors have an influence over the 
cost of engaging in politics but not their desire. As expected the level of education in 
a country is a strong determinant of engaging in politics. This was expected as both 
of our scatterplots representing education showed upward trends. Both the percent 
of the population enrolled in tertiary education and the education index correlate 
significantly with a higher propensity to engage in politics. The role of information 
and technology is also highlighted here, as the level of press suppression is 
negatively correlated with the PAI. Meanwhile the number of Internet users within a 
society is positively associated with the PAI. This is also shown by the scatter plot 
displaying the Infrastructure index, the regression results mirror what is visually 
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represented in the graph. Hence one can conclude that countries in which there is 
great access to the communication technology and independently verified 
information there is a higher chance for the citizens of that society to engage in 
politics. Furthermore, unlike political interest, the PAI is significantly correlated 
with the level of democracy. Surprisingly inequality had no relationship with a 
country’s propensity for political action. This is in line with the results displayed in 
the above scatter plots; however, it is somewhat contradictory to studies espousing  
The negative effects inequality has on the political system. 
 
Table 4 showing the relationship between my independent variables and each component of PAI 
  
Independent 
Variables Index 
Petition
s Signed 
Petitions 
Might 
Strikes 
Joined 
Strikes 
Might 
Boycotts 
Done 
Boycotts 
Might 
Event 
Attended 
Event 
Might 
Corruption .282** .69** .178* 0.072 .366** .129** .418** 0.049 .373** 
Parking 
tickets -0.112* 
Democracy 3.18** 6.63** 2.52** 1.02* 4.1** 1.31** 3.63** 1.12* 4.46**13 
Press 
Freedom .333** .703** -.23* -.15* -.44** .14** -.37** -.14* -.497** 
GDP 1e-12* 2e-12* 9e-13 -8e-14 1e-12 4e-13 1e-12** -1e-13 2e-13* 
GDP per 
Capita .0003** .0008** .0002 -9e5 .0005** .0001** .0005** .0001* .0005** 
Education 26.28** 75.24** 13.2 -.350 32.71** 12.7** 38.5** 4.23 40.6** 
HDI 34.6** 91.91** 18.45 1.45 43.1** 16.8** 50.1** 9.30 48.58** 
Internet 
Access .193** .47** .09 .38 .245** .095** .293** .021 .268** 
Urban Pop. .113** .345** .021 .027 .12 .064* .12 .069 .11 
Infrastructu
re 3.49** 7.36** 1.62 .66 4.19** 1.8** 6.34** .754 4.28** 
 
 
                                                        
13The first number represents the coefficient of the relationship. * signifies p-values 
below .05 and ** signifies p-values below .00 
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 The number of parking tickets unpaid and corruption are both 
positively correlated with the percent of the population, which has joined a strike. 
This signals that those living with corruption are less content and more likely to 
strike (an extreme form of contention). However, they show the same relationship 
as the index for each of the other individual measures of action. This supports the 
validity of the political action index as a measure of the propensity for a country’s 
citizens to engage in one of the above forms of action. 
Findings – The regression results that will drive the discussion portion of this 
paper. 
The first crucial result is that the political action index is always positively 
correlated with an interest in politics. Although the relationship is not statistically 
significant it does provide a level of robustness to the relationship between interest 
and engagement. This is significant because it adds to the importance of an already 
important measure, political interest. It also allows for connections to be made 
between political interest and the political action index, because they exhibit similar 
relationships. 
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Table 5 Bivariate regresion model explaining political action and interest 
Dependent Variable                                        Magnitude                                                            Significance 
Political Action Index Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
Independent Variables 
    Very Interested 0.0593225 0.1883458 0.31 0.754 
Sum of Total Interest 0.1268472 0.0856038 1.48 0.145 
 
The relationship between corruption and the political action index is one that 
I find especially interesting. It is especially interesting because the relationship 
remains statistically significant even when controlling for development, inequality, 
level of democracy score, and the level of Internet access14. 
Table 6 Bivariate regresion model results for political action and corruption 
Dependent Variable Magnitude 
  
Significance 
Political Action Index Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
Independent Variable 
    Corruption 0.2823635 0.047585 5.93 .000 
_con 5.827306 2.421209 2.41 0.02 
                                                        
14 see table 7 
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Table 7 Multiple regresion model results for political action and corruption with controls 
Dependent Variable Magnitude 
  
Significance 
Political Action Index Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
Independent Variable 
    Corruption 0.210068 0.095952 2.19 0.034 
Control Variables     
Internet Use -0.007627 0.096295 -0.08 0.937 
HDI -18.72887 18.92443 -0.99 0.328 
Gini 0.0030068 0.110211 0.03 0.978 
EIU Democracy Score 2.438805 0.835692 2.92 0.006 
Very Interested -0.0398091 0.157734 -0.25 0.802 
_cons 8.67507 12.33757 0.70 0.486 
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Figure 18 displays the controls variables on the X-axis and the PAI on the Y-axis 
 I have also found the relationship between corruption and political action to 
be relatively strong. The original coefficient15 of .28 means that for every 5 points a 
country improves their corruption score the proportion of the population that is 
likely to engage in political action will rise 1 whole percentage point. This may not 
seem like a lot, but if a country such as Brazil were to improve its corruption score 
20 points to the level of a country such as Portugal, they currently are rated at 43 
and 63 respectively, a 5% increase in the proportion of the population willing to 
engage in politics would occur. This means that over 10 million more people would 
be willing to engage in politics. Hence, lowering corruption would be an immense 
improvement in democratic health for any country. 
                                                        
15 Before controls were introduced. 
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 The finding that corruption decreases the proportion of the population 
willing to engage in political action is in line with the conclusion found by Sofia 
Olsson that “At country-level, the aggregated corruption measure displays a strong 
negative effect on non-institutionalized participation, whereas no significant effect 
of corruption is found for institutionalized participation”(Olsson 2013) 
 It also takes the conclusion, of Stockemer et al. and Anderson et al., that 
corruption decreases satisfaction with democracy one step further. It shifts the 
effects of corruption from our attitudes to our actual behavior. This study helps to 
establish a more concrete relationship between corruption and uninvolved 
populace.  
Of course the problem of indigeneity (dual causation/feedback style etc.) is 
present in this analysis. There is an argument that the reason there is corruption is 
due to a lack of interest and engagement, and that “effective and uncorrupted 
governments only arise whenever public civicness or certain ethical beliefs 
constitute a dominant value in the political community” (Adsera et al.2003). The 
question that arises is whether there is less participation because there is more 
corruption, or rather because there is less participation corruption is allowed to 
persist. To help solve this dilemma I used a variable used in a study by a UC Berkley 
Professor who found that the number of unpaid parking tickets a country’s diplomat 
received in NYC from 1998-2002 correlated strongly and significantly with a 
country’s corruption index score. I found that the number of unpaid tickets also 
shows a negative correlation that is statistically significant with a country’s political 
action index score. 
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  This is enlightening because there is no logical way that the number of 
parking tickets a country’s official received could directly affect the desire of a 
society to engage in some form of political action. In other words, it makes the 
possibility that the reverse relationship between corruption and political action is 
true. This represents exogenous correlation, allowing me to say that the level of 
corruption in a country is what is driving the proportion of the population engaging 
in politics and not the other way around. This is evidenced by the below table which 
shows that the political action index is negatively and significantly correlated with 
the number of unpaid parking tickets received by a country’s official. This 
relationship persists even when controlling for the total level of interest in the 
country, GDP, and inequality. Yet, this relationship is not present with those “very 
interested” in politics. However, it is present with the total proportion of the 
population showing an interest in politics. 
Table 8 Bivariate regresion model results for political action and the # of parking tickets 
Dependent Variable Magnitude 
  
Significance  
Political Action Index Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
Independent Variable 
    Unpaid Parking Tickets -0.111810 0.0488582 -2.29 0.027 
_cons 20.38481 1.412681 14.43 0 
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Table 9 Multiple regresion model results for political action and #of parking tickets with controls 
Dependent Variable Magnitude 
  
Significance 
Political Action Index Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
Independent Variable 
    Unpaid Parking Tickets -0.112945 0.0519138 -2.18 0.036 
Control Variables     
Gini -0.044769 0.1434822 -0.31 0.757 
Sum of Total Interest 0.1336554 0.0966972 1.38 0.175 
GDP 7.55E-13 8.42E-13 0.9 0.375 
_cons 15.19494 7.584595 2 0.052 
 
Table 10 Multiple regresion model results for the proportion very interested and corruption with 
controls 
Dependent Variable Magnitude 
  
Significance 
Very Interested Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
Independent Variable 
    Corruption 0.0683573 0.083734 0.82 0.419 
Control Variables     
HDI -38.97671 16.53928 -2.36 0.023 
Gini -0.1233633 0.102600 -1.2 0.236 
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Internet use 0.0315742 0.091766 0.34 0.732 
EIU Democracy Score 0.8153235 0.620526 1.31 0.196 
_cons 35.73291 10.40166 3.44 0.001 
Table 11 Multiple regresion model results for the proportion interested in politics and corruption with 
controls 
Dependent Variable Magnitude Significance 
Sum of Total Interest Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
Independent Variable 
    Corruption 0.4391456 0.1775951 2.47 0.017 
Control Variables     
HDI -67.19994 35.0787 -1.92 0.062 
Gini -0.4616989 0.2176084 -2.12 0.039 
Internet use -0.0312759 0.1946298 -0.16 0.873 
EIU Democracy Score -0.139371 1.316095 -0.11 0.916 
_cons 94.23272 22.06122 4.27 0 
There are several hypothetical explanations that could explain the fact that 
corruption does not seem to predict the acuteness of the interest in society but it 
does seem to predict the overall level of interest in society. It seems that corruption 
is affecting the percentage of the population that shows a very high interest in 
politics differently than those that are somewhat interested in politics. This is 
because individuals within these two cohorts view corruption differently. How an 
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individual’s opinions and support for the current political system reacts to 
corruption depends on whether or not they support the ruling party. A 2003 study 
found that “citizens in the political majority thought the political system worked 
better than did those in the minority.” Their results also show “show robust support 
for the conclusion that corruption has less of a negative effect on evaluations of the 
political system among respondents in the political majority” (Anderson et al 2003). 
Taking this into account along with the fact that individuals demonstrating party 
allegiance tend to be more interested in politics (Martin 2003), one can assume that 
those “very interested” in politics tend to be aligned with one party or another. This 
phenomenon makes assessing the effects of corruption on the most interested 
cohort ambiguous because of the lack of information pertaining to the composition 
of the group. Thus, one reason corruption does not correlate negatively with the 
percentage of the population that is very interested in politics could be due to the 
fact that many of those “very interested” align themselves with the party in power 
and are not significantly affected by the corruption. 
 This also supports previous findings that corruption lowers trust in 
politicians, the political system, institutions, and decreases satisfaction. It is 
therefore reasonable to conclude that corruption is also negatively affecting the 
proportion of the population interested in politics. 
 The strength of the relationship between corruption and the total level of 
interest in politics in society is even stronger than the correlation between 
corruption and the political action index. The coefficient is .44 even when 
controlling for the level of development, inequality, Internet access, and level of 
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democracy. This entails a prediction that for every two points of improvement in 
corruption the total proportion of the population interested in politics will rise by 
approximately one whole percentage point. Keeping our Brazilian example from 
earlier, a twenty point improvement would indicate over 20 million more people 
interested in politics within society. Given that we have established political interest 
as the primary motivator behind any political behavior this is quite significant. 
 
Wealth – As mentioned in the results section the average wealth across individuals 
was the only country level factor statistically correlated with the total level of 
interest in politics. What is even more encouraging is that this result remains 
significant even when controlling for the freedom of the press, the level of 
democracy, corruption, urban demographics, and development.  
Table 12 Bivariate regresion model results for the proportion interested in politics and wealth with 
controls 
Dependent Variable Magnitude 
  
Significance 
Sum of Total Interest Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
Independent Variable 
    GDP per Capita 0.0002179 0.000089 2.450 0.018 
_cons 42.061 2.37236 17.73 0.000 
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Table 13 Multiple regresion model results for the proportion interested in politics and wealth with 
controls 
Dependent Variable Magnitude 
  
Significance 
Sum of Total Interest Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
Independent Variable 
    GDP per Capita 0.0005558 0.00014 3.76 0.000 
Control Variables     
EIU Democracy Score 1.111693 1.53110 0.73 0.471 
Freedom of the Press 0.1998567 0.17947 1.11 0.271 
Corruption -0.0004321 0.16352 0 0.998 
Urban Population -0.2241361 0.11337 -1.98 0.054 
HDI -38.88457 26.7013 -1.46 0.152 
_cons 67.01541 18.9721 3.53 0.001 
 
Table 14 Bivariate regresion model results for the proportion interested in politics and wealth  
Dependent Variable Magnitude 
  
Significance 
Sum of Total Interest Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
Independent Variable 
    Gross National Income 0.0001731 0.00008 2.04 0.046 
_cons 42.02023 2.62796 15.99 0.000 
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Table 15 Multiple regresion model results for the proportion interested in politics and wealth with 
controls 
Dependent Variable Magnitude 
  
                Significance 
Sum of Total Interest Coef. Std. Err.      t                                  P>t 
Independent Variable 
    Gross National Income 0.000389 0.0001312 2.97 0.005 
Control Variables     
EIU Democracy Score 1.508981 1.696411 0.89 0.378 
Freedom of the Press 0.1970482 0.1878796 1.05 0.299 
Corruption 0.132959 0.1584646 0.84 0.405 
Urban Population -0.23681 0.1195383 -1.98 0.053 
HDI -36.32274 28.2351 -1.29 0.204 
_cons 58.56005 19.42067 3.02 0.004 
 
The strength of the relationship is relatively weak, and there is not vast room 
for improvement amongst countries. Of course, every country will continue to their 
best to improve their GDP per a Capita, but they should not do so with improving 
the level of democracy in their country in mind. The coefficient of .00021 requires 
increasing GDP per Capita by 5000 U.S. dollars in order to elicit a 1% improvement 
in the proportion of the population interested in politics within their country. This 
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would mean that Brazil would have to increase its GDP twenty five thousand U.S. 
dollars, to the level of an OECD country such as New Zealand, to elicit the 20 million 
person increase in interested persons discussed earlier. However, this is a stronger 
coefficient than found by Stockemer study regarding democratic satisfaction where 
his model predicts that for every 10,000 dollar the GDP per capita of a country 
increases satisfaction ratings with democracy increase by approximately 1 
percentage point. The relationship between GDP per capita is twice as strong with 
interest. This could point to the conclusion an interest in political is a leading 
variable in the transition to democracy, and that citizens become more interested in 
democracy before they improve it, and become more satisfied.  
While this paper is not prescriptive in nature, these results imply that 
governments should concentrate on decreasing the level of corruption in their 
society to improve the level of democracy rather than increasing average wealth. 
The improvements necessary to induce a 20 point decrease in the level of 
corruption should be much easier and timely to implement than the long term 
economic development required to increase GDP per a capita twenty five thousand 
dollars. 
However this result still has explanatory significance in that it helps us 
understand why rich countries have healthy democracies16. This supports basic 
modernization theory, which states the level of wealth increases within a country 
                                                        
16 Of course there is a belief that countries are rich because they have healthy 
democracies. The fact that the these events occurring in an inverse order also makes 
logical sense points to these events most likely occurring simultaneously. However, 
this is assuredly outside the scope of this paper. 
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and the middle class grows, the populace acquires more free time. Some of this free 
time is spent learning and becoming interested in politics. 
Discussion – 
The only independent variable that correlated with more than one of my 
dependent variables regarding political interest was the variable measuring 
individual wealth within a society.  
The result that the level of democracy was not significantly correlated with 
the level of political interest is hopeful for those desiring to spread democracy. The 
initial predication was that political interest would be lower in countries that are 
more autocratic. It is in line with the finding that the “level of democracy was not 
related to system performance evaluations. Thus, once levels of development and 
economic performance were accounted for, citizens in more democratic countries 
were no more critical of the way their political system worked. Similarly, democratic 
age did not affect evaluations of the political system once other macro-level factors 
were accounted for” (Anderson and Tverdov 2003). However, this does not seem to 
be the case, giving hope that the citizens in those countries are more ready for 
democracy than believed. 
 However, multiple independent variables correlated significantly with the 
political action index (PAI). In fact each of my independent variables correlated 
significantly with the PAI except for the measure of inequality and the expenditure 
of public schools. This means that equal countries have similar propensities to 
engage in politics as unequal countries, which is good news for those fighting 
inequality. It is also good news for governments concerned with maintaining power, 
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as these results indicate they can spend as much as they want on primary schools 
without the worry of decreasing the security of their power.  
This result represents a very interesting dichotomy between an interest in 
politics and having had actually acted or having the willingness to act in politics. 
This points out the country level variables determining the cost to the cohort of 
engaging in politics. These relationships demonstrate the predicated relationships 
before the regressions were run. The fact that the level of democracy does not 
determine the level of interest in politics, but that it is significantly correlated with 
the propensity to engage in action is interesting. It points to the fact that 
engagement in healthier democracies is easier. This is most likely due to healthy 
democracies having avenues for expressing discontent, while countries with lower 
levels of democracy tend to be more oppressive and most likely make political 
engagement much more difficult. 
Conclusion 
This paper examined the relationships between a host of country level 
variables and two dependent variables measuring political interest and 
participation. This was done through the use of graphical and statistic analytic tools, 
to measure the significance and magnitude of any present relationships. For the 
most part ,there were few statistically significant relationships between my chosen 
independent variables and political interest, some of which were surprising. 
However, there were significantly more relationships present between my country 
level variables and political action. 
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This paper has proposed several relationships between country level 
variables and the level of political interest in a country as well as the propensity for 
political action. It adds to the literature regarding political interest, as it eliminates 
the tested variables, except for individual income, as country level variables that are 
indicative of political interest and participation. Finally, the finding that corruption 
drives a decrease in political action and interest is significant for democratic 
theorist attempting to improve the level of democracy in transitional countries. It 
provides further support for eliminating corruption quickly. Furthermore, I have 
helped to eliminate certain country level variables as indicators of political interest 
and participation. This aids the study of the political culture within a country by 
identifying which country level variables should be considered when examining 
political interest and participation. 
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Appendix: Interesting Results outside scope of paper 
There was one statistically significantly correlation for the percent of the 
population “very interested” in politics. This was that the percent of the eligible 
population enrolled in tertiary education was negatively correlated with the 
proportion of people “very interested” in politics. This relationship remains negative 
and significant (even becomes more significant) when controlling for the level of 
democracy in a country, the perception of corruption, individual income, inequality, 
and the freedom of the press. 
This is unexpected as higher-level education is generally viewed as a strong 
indicator of an interest in politics and participation. It is one of the three biggest 
factors predicating participation17. Yet, these results seem to tell a different story. 
There could be a variety of factors that explain these results; perhaps the proportion 
enrolled is not as important as the proportion graduating, or the quality of tertiary 
education varies greatly between countries. Regardless results displayed below 
provide an interesting avenue for research on the roll that tertiary education has on 
the proportion of the populace very interested in politics. 
 
Dependent Variable Magnitude 
  
Significance 
Very Interested Coef. Std. Err. t              P>t 
Independent Variable 
    Tertiary Enrollment Ratio -0.0636992 0.0356992 -1.78 0.081 
                                                        
17 The “big three” so to speak are Age, Education, and Income 
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Dependent Variable Magnitude 
  
Significance 
Very Interested Coef. Std. Err. t                 P>t 
Independent Variable 
    Tertiary Enrollment Ratio -0.1343063 0.0476157 -2.82 0.007 
Control Variables     
EIU Democracy Score 1.310687 0.888052 1.48 0.148 
Freedom of the Press -0.0366403 0.1048111 -0.35 0.728 
Corruption -0.1156672 0.106548 -1.09 0.284 
GDP per a Capita 0.0001027 0.0000775 1.32 0.193 
Gini -0.1109943 0.1244564 -0.89 0.378 
_cons 19.26389 8.233479 2.34 0.024 
 
 
 
There was also one statistically significant correlation for the percent of the 
population “somewhat” interested in politics. This was that the percent of the 
population “somewhat” interested in politics should a statistically significant 
negative correlation with corruption. That is to say, as the level of perceived 
corruption in society increases the percentage of the population “somewhat” 
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interested in politics decreases. It interesting because this relationship is not 
significant with the other levels of political interest, leading one to believe that 
perhaps corruption effects those marginally interest in politics more. Furthermore, 
it remains statistically significant even when controlling for other country level 
factors such as the level of democracy, the level of education, development, 
inequality, and wealth. The question becomes how an individual’s response changed 
due to corruption. Did they change their response to “Very interested” or to “not 
that interested”. Unfortunately, the World Value Survey does not allow us analyze 
individual’s data but a study of corruption’s effects on the individuals marginally 
interested in politics could be worthwhile. 
 
Dependent Variable Magnitude 
  
Significance 
Somewhat Interested Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
     Corruption 0.1132609 0.0597708 1.89 0.063 
_cons 28.33548 3.065872 9.24 0 
 
Regression model with controls 
Dependent Variable Magnitude 
  
Significance 
SomeINT Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
Independent Variable 
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Corruption 0.3509579 0.1207623 2.91 0.006 
Control Variables     
EIU Democracy Score -0.8997205 0.8739631 -1.03 0.309 
Education Index -11.55969 21.87233 -0.53 0.6 
HDI -23.50278 32.43517 -0.72 0.473 
Gini -0.4034037 0.1472439 -2.74 0.009 
GDP 9.94E-13 5.00E-13 1.99 0.053 
Internet use -0.0496378 0.1295417 -0.38 0.703 
_cons 64.31143 14.95184 4.3 0 
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